Global Sales Contact List

Contact   A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

RSA Laboratories

Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys

Citation: Y. Zhang, A. Juels, M. K. Reiter, and T. Ristenpart. Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys. ACM CCS, 2012.

Abstract: This paper details the construction of an access-driven side-channel attack by which a malicious virtual machine (VM) extracts fine-grained information from a victim VM running on the same physical computer. This attack is the first such attack demonstrated on a symmetric multiprocessing system virtualized using a modern VMM (Xen). Such systems are very common today, ranging from desktops that use virtualization to sandbox application or OS compromises, to clouds that co-locate the workloads of mutually distrustful customers. Constructing such a side-channel requires overcoming challenges including core migration, numerous sources of channel noise, and the difficulty of preempting the victim with sufficient frequency to extract fine-grained information from it. This paper addresses these challenges and demonstrates the attack in a lab setting by extracting an ElGamal decryption key from a victim using the most recent version of the libgcrypt cryptographic library.

Click here for paper

Full Publication List